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4PREFACE
On 19 September 2016, in response to the large movements of refugees and migrants 
around the world, the UN General Assembly held its first ever summit dedicated to this 
topic. The outcome was the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants,  which not 
only reaffirms the importance of existing legal instruments to protect refugees and migrants, 
but also foresees two new global Compacts; one on refugees, and one of safe, orderly and 
regular migration. Both compacts are scheduled to be adopted by the General Assembly 
in the summer of 2018. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
is responsible for the negotiation of the Compact on Refugees. The Compact for Safe, 
Orderly and Regular Migration is primarily in the hands of the UN Special Representative 
for International Migration2, assisted by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), 
which became a UN related organisation in July of 2016.3
While both these organisations have expressed much enthusiasm for the prospects of these 
new agreements in responding to the current challenges surrounding migration and refugee 
protection 4,  the final content and resultant impact of each compact are as of yet uncertain. 
More fundamentally, there is little clarity on exactly what kind of international agreement 
a compact is, and where it sits in relation to existing instruments of international law and 
international relations. The term appears to have arrived fairly recently in international and 
regional discussions as an increasingly popular political tool with restricted legal content. 
The objective of this working paper is to examine what a compact is, how it relates to other 
international instruments, and what, if any, normative implications follow from such an 
instrument. The working paper secondly analyses the likely impact of the Compact for Safe, 
Orderly and Regular Migration on human rights of migrants by examining the role of re-
lated UN compacts, the negotiation process for the Global Compact on Migration so far, as 
well as the political context in relation to other agreements in this area. Our concern is that 
inter-state agreements which concern rights of individuals (in this case migrants) must take 
forms which complement existing international legal obligations of states. These new forms 
of agreement are welcome if their content raises standards of treatment of migrants above 
the exiting floor of rights contained in international conventions. They are a threat, however, 
to the UN human rights conventions if they, either intentionally or unintentionally, appear to 
lower existing standards of human rights. 
––––––––––––––
2 Currently Louise Arbour https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/sga1712.doc.htm 
3 Elspeth Guild, Stefanie Grant and Kees Groenendijk, ‘IOM and the UN: Unfinished Business’, Queen Mary School of Law Legal 
Studies Research Paper No. 255/2017, 6 March 2017.
4 See for instance, Volker Türk, ’A Minor Miracle: A New Global Compact on Refugees’, Address to the Kaldor Centre for International 
Refugee Law, University of New South Wales, Sydney, 18 November 2016, http://www.unhcr.org/admin/dipstatements/583404887/
minor-miracle-new-global-compact-refugees.html
5The UN’s Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration5 is not the first foray of 
the UN into international law and policy making on migration. In 1990 the UN opened 
for ratification the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of Their Families6 which currently has 51 parties and 15 signatories, 
though a number of powerful states which consider themselves destination countries for 
migrants have shunned the convention7. In 2000, two migration related protocols8 were 
attached to the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, one regarding the 
suppression of migrant smuggling, the other trafficking in human beings. These two 
protocols brought a transnational crime law dimension to migrations.9 While it is sometimes 
suggested that since 2000 the international community can only agree on repressive measures 
in respect of migration, the successful conclusion of the ILO’s convention concerning de-
cent conditions for domestic workers in 2011 belied this assessment.10 This convention, 
while addressing generally the issue of working conditions on domestic workers, includes 
provisions directed at the protection of migrants who are also domestic workers, 
a group which has been the subject of much international concern.11  The international 
community does not necessarily appear to have lost its appetite for binding international 
commitments regarding migrants and their rights.
On the policy side, in 2005 the UN published the report of a Global Commission on 
International Migration (GCIM).12 The result of a Global Commission on Migration was to 
establish a new forum for civil society dialogue, the Global Forum for Migration and 
Development (GFMD). The GCIM report also jumpstarted the process of rooting migration 
more deeply into the UN by creating the Office of the Special Representative to the Secretary 
General of the UN – currently charged with negotiating the Global Compact for Safe, 
Orderly and Regular Migration. On an ad-hoc basis at first, the UN High Level Dialogue on 
Migration and Development (HLD) was first held in 2006 resulting in a report as well.13  
  
––––––––––––––
5  Elspeth Guild and Stephanie Grant, ’Migration Governance in the UN: What is the Global Compact and What does it mean?’, Legal 
Studies Research Paper No. 252/2017, Queen Mary University of London.
6 UN General Assembly, International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, 
18 December 1990, A/RES/45/158, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3980.html [accessed 7 August 2017]
7Ryszard Cholewinski, Paul FA Guchteneire and Antoine Pécoud, eds. Migration and human rights: the United Nations convention on 
migrant workers’ rights, Cambridge University Press, 2009.
8 UN General Assembly, Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, Supplementing the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 15 November 2000, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/479dee062.html 
[accessed 7 August 2017] ; UN General Assembly, Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women 
and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 15 November 2000, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/4720706c0.html [accessed 7 August 2017] 
9  François Crépeau, ‘The fight against migrant smuggling: Migration containment over refugee protection’(2003).
10  International Labour Organization (ILO), Convention Concerning Decent Work for Domestic Workers, 16 June 2011, PRNo.15A, 
available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/4e0d784e2.html [accessed 7 August 2017]
11 Bridget Anderson, ‘A very private business: exploring the demand for migrant domestic workers’, 14(3) European Journal of Women’s 
Studies (2007) 247-264.
12  http://www.un.org/esa/population/meetings/fourthcoord2005/P09_GCIM.pdf accessed 28 February 2017
13  http://www.un.org/esa/population/meetings/HLD2013/documents/Consolidated_Global_%20Report_from_Regional_Consultations.pdf 
accessed 28 February 2017.
6These HLDs are now held on a regular basis, 2008, 2013, 2016 and one is planned for 
2018. There are many UN and non UN bodies14 and agencies which engage in migration 
related activities which meet regularly under the aegis of the Global Migration Group which 
is led by a UN agency on a rotating basis, in 2017 by United Nations University.15 But the 
outputs are generally in the form of reports, recommendations or common understandings 
below the level of binding norms.
Between the hard law commitments of the conventions and the ‘soft’ instruments of reports 
and recommendations falls the form of a compact. In this working paper, we will examine 
what the importance of this new form is and why it has become prevalent in this field.
––––––––––––––
14  See, e.g. The World Bank.
15 http://www.globalmigrationgroup.org/ accessed 28 February 2017.
7SECTION 1: 
The Normative Impact of the Global Compact on Safe, 
Orderly and Regular Migration
Thomas Gammeltoft Hansen
Among the two compacts currently being negotiated, the Global Compact on Migration 
arguably holds both the largest potential and is likely to face the biggest challenges. Global 
governance in regard to migration is notoriously fragmented and incoherent.16 This applies 
to international law as well. There is no instrument similar to the 1951 Convention Relating 
to Refugees guiding the broader field of migration.17 As a result, international migration law 
relies, on the one hand, on international labour law and general human rights law and, on 
the other hand, the growing network of bilateral and regional agreement in regard to 
different aspects of migration management, governing in particular readmission, border 
control and labour migration quotas. A new UN agreement on migration, with the support of 
origin, transit and receiving countries alike, thus has the potential to fill an important normative 
vacuum.
The question, however, remains to what extent the envisioned Global Compact on 
Migration will establish such a normative framework. At face value, the answer seems to be 
no. The September 2016 New York Declaration commits states only to adopting non-bin-
ding principles on the treatment of migrants in vulnerable situations.18 The ‘compact’ as a 
choice of instrument further seems to place emphasis on political and practical cooperation 
as opposed to legal commitments.19  Indeed, the term ‘compact’ occupies a peculiar space in 
international relations, somewhere in between politics and law. While compacts may con-
tain detailed guidelines and standards, they are rarely presented as binding instruments 
in themselves and tend to place emphasis on more technical and procedural aspects of 
‘good governance’. Indeed, the non-binding character of the compact seems to have been 
a precondition for broader state support.20 
Upon closer inspection, however, the Global Compact for Migration may well come to 
have a considerable normative impact on the field of international migration law, despite 
its non-binding status. The central argument forwarded in the present working paper is 
that given its broad scope and fragmented state of international migration law, the Global 
Compact for Migration is bound to become an important soft law instrument, whether the 
––––––––––––––  
16  Alexander Betts (ed.), Global Migration Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
17 The possible exception being in the field of labour migration. In 1990 the UN signed the Convention on the Protection of the Rights  
of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, which entered into force in 2003. So far, however, this instrument has only been 
ratified by 49 states. These primarily count countries of origin, with some notable exceptions, e.g. Turkey and Mexico, who are both 
major destination states. Several ILO conventions focus on protecting specific aspects of labour migration, including Number 97 (1949) 
and 143 (1975).
18 UN Doc. A/RES/71/1, para 52.
19 See further section 2.
20 See further Section 2.
21 A soft law instrument is here understood as referring to any instrument with normative content that by its form and provenance provi-
des support sufficient to establish the minimum threshold of traction for at least some of the norms contained therein to be regarded as 
soft law. The emphasis is thus on the substantive norms as opposed to the formal status of the instrument itself. See John Cerone, ‘A 
Taxonomy of Soft Law’ in: Stephanie Lagoutte, Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen and John Cerone (eds.), The Roles of Soft Law in Human 
Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).
8drafting states intend it to or not.21 The compact may play this role in several ways. First, 
even within a more governance-oriented framework, the Global Compact for Migration is 
likely to include a number of more technical and standard-setting norms in relation to both 
overall cooperation and the implementation framework. While formally not considered 
binding, other areas of international law highlight that such norms may nonetheless be 
hugely important in governing state behaviour. 22
 
Second, the compact may come to have a norm-filling role 23  by setting out common ‘prin-
ciples, commitments and understandings’24 in regard to existing rules and their interpretation in 
established areas of international law. Annex II of the New York Declaration notes: 
We will cooperate internationally to ensure safe, orderly and regular migration 
involving full respect for human rights and the humane treatment of migrants, 
regardless of migration status. We underline the need to ensure respect for the 
dignity of migrants and the protection of their rights under applicable international 
law, including the principle of non-discrimination under international law.25 
Given the continued gaps and interpretative uncertainties in this area, how and to what 
extent the final compact references existing international human rights law (as well as other 
areas of international law such as the law of the sea and international labour law) are thus 
important. The Global Compact for Migration represents a major opportunity to ensure 
continued state support for international law, clarify the inter-operation between different 
regimes and to integrate and build on the large corpus of existing standards and principles 
developed over the last decades.26
   
Third and most tentatively, the Global Compact on Migration may end up setting out sub-
stantively new norms in regard to international migration that may eventually pave the way 
for binding international law in the form of either custom or treaty. As the Secretary General’s 
Special Representative for International Migration Peter Sutherland notes:
The global compact on migration could bundle agreed norms and principles into 
a global framework agreement with both binding and non-binding elements and 
identify areas in which States may work together towards the conclusion of new 
international norms and treaties.27
––––––––––––––  
22 One such example is the standards and recommended practice developed by the ICAO Council annexed to the 1944 Chicago 
Convention on International Civil Aviation, governing among other things the responsibilities of airlines in regard to inadmissible 
passengers (Annex 9).
23  Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, John Cerone and Stephanie Lagoutte, ’Tracing the Roles of Soft Law in Human Rights’, in Stephanie 
Lagoutte, Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen and John Cerone (eds.), The Roles of Soft Law in Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2016).
24 UN General Assembly, Modalities for the intergovernmental negotiations of the global compact for safe, orderly and regular migration, 
UN Doc. A/Res/71/280, 1
25 UN Doc. A/RES/71/1, Annex II, para 5.
26 Elspeth Guild and Stephanie Grant, ’Migration Governance in the UN: What is the Global Compact and What does it mean?’, Legal 
Studies Research Paper No. 252/2017, Queen Mary University of London.
27 UN Doc. A/71/28, para 87
9As mentioned above, the political appetite for developing substantively new norms as part 
of the compact process is arguably small. At the same time, however, there is an obvious 
need for further norm development in this area.
More generally, the Global Compact on Migration may be argued to play into a wider trend 
towards what some have called the ‘softification’ of international governance.28  While inter-
national law and legal agreements arguably still structure much, if not most, international 
cooperation, an increasing part of the normative standards the last decades have taken 
the form of non-binding agreements and other instruments short of positive international 
law. The trend towards increasing use of soft law is particularly pronounced in the area of 
human rights. While relatively few human rights treaties have been adopted at the UN level 
in the last two decades, the number of declarations, resolutions, conclusions and princip-
les has grown almost exponentially.29 This new realm of soft law can be seen to shape and 
impact upon the content of international law in multiple ways: from being a first step in 
a norm-making process, to providing detailed rules and more technical standards required 
for the interpretation and the implementation of existing rules of positive law. At the same 
time, the increasing use of soft law instruments raises concerns about the overall develop-
ment and coherence of international law and the possible dilution of individual human rights. 
This development raises several questions in terms of the possible normative impact of the 
Global Compact for Migration. In some areas of human rights law, soft law has come to 
fill a void in the absence of treaty law, exerting a significant degree of normative force 
notwithstanding its non-binding character. Should the Compact theoretically succeed in 
setting out substantively new norms, this is a possible prospect, given the lack of hard law 
instruments in this area. 
It should be underscored, however, that in whatever way(s) the Compact for Global 
Migration may come to exercise normative influence, there is no guarantee that it will 
necessarily improve the human rights protection of migrants. Within liberal human rights 
theory there is often an implicit assumption that soft law plays a progressive role, raising 
protection standards, and that soft law will eventually solidify or lead to ‘norm cascade’.30 
This builds on the idea that the existence of non-binding 31 norms and the consensus that 
emerges as states begin to comply with them appears to stimulate the development 
of legally-binding norms.  As documented elsewhere, however, these assumptions are far 
from always true.32 
––––––––––––––    
28 See e.g. Karsten Nowroot, ’Aiding and Abetting in Theorising the Increasing Softification of the International Normative Order: A Darker 
Legacy of Jessup’s Transnational Law?, Paper presented at the 2016 Signature Conference of the Transnational Law Institute, King’s 
College, London, Kuly 2016. See further section 4.
29 Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, John Cerone and Stephanie Lagoutte, ’Tracing the Roles of Soft Law in Human Rights’, in Stephanie 
Lagoutte, Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen and John Cerone (eds.), The Roles of Soft Law in Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2016).
30 M. Finnemore and K. Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’, International Organization vol. 52 (1998): 887-917.
31 Dina Shelton, ‘Commentary and Conclusions’ (on human rights and soft-law), in Dina Shelton, ed., Commitment and Compliance. 
The Role of Non-Binding Norms in the International Legal System (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 449-463 at 461.
32 Stephanie Lagoutte, Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen and John Cerone (eds.), The Roles of Soft Law in Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2016).
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First, in some areas today soft law constitutes a primary reference point, and yet there seem 
to be no immediate prospects for codification or crystallisation of soft law into hard law. Soft 
law may be a preferred means by states in order to respond more quickly, with less paucity 
and more flexibility. Yet, it can also be used to block or delay the subsequent development 
of hard law instruments, and states may prefer the sometimes contradictory language of 
soft law instruments in order to retain political manoeuvring room. To the extent that this 
remains the case, soft law may equally reduce the legal quality of the protection they other-
wise could afford individuals in international human rights law.
Second, the normative impact of the Compact for Global Migration ultimately depends on 
the subsequent acceptance by states of any normative statement therein not simply 
reflecting existing international law. In other words, the eventual Compact becomes a soft 
law instrument only once it acquires a degree of traction. While adoption of the Compact by 
the UN General Assembly may be seen as an important step in this regard, the provenance 
of a soft law instrument such as the Compact does not in and of itself imbue any norms 
contained therein with a particular normative force.33 Conversely, the Compact does not 
preclude the later adoption of new norms or treaties on different issues, as the Sutherland 
report makes clear.
Third, and perhaps most important in the present context, soft law instruments have today 
also become the battleground for interpretive struggles. In some cases, state-led soft law 
processes are clearly used as a strategy for parties actively seeking to backtrack or hedge 
against dynamic developments in the interpretation of international human rights law.34 In 
this light, the degree to which the final text of the compact comes to reflect existing 
principles and understandings of international law is extremely important, and concerns 
have been raised that the latest draft does not sufficiently reflect the substantial develop-
ments in standard setting over the last two decades.35 Vice versa, as a hybrid instrument 
focusing more on governance aspects, the compact may potentially come to serve as an 
‘umbrella’ for a range of different non-binding standards, recommendations, best practices 
etc. addressed both to state and non-state actors.
In sum, what the Global Compact on Migration will mean for the future development of 
international migration law is still unclear. Even if few expect the final text to set out new 
primary norms of international law, the compact nonetheless has the potential to substan-
tially impact the protection of migrants by pulling together and reaffirming the disparate 
binding legal commitments governing international migration and duly reflecting interpretive 
developments within e.g. international human rights law, the law on search and rescue and 
international labour law. As the subsequent sections highlight, however, this is far from the 
only role played by UN and regional compacts. Nor is the political context particularly 
conducive to such an undertaking. 
––––––––––––––    
33 John Cerone, ‘A Taxonomy of Soft Law’ in Stephanie Lagoutte, Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen and John Cerone (eds.), The Roles of 
Soft Law in Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).
34 Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, John Cerone and Stephanie Lagoutte, ’Tracing the Roles of Soft Law in Human Rights’, in Stephanie 
Lagoutte, Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen and John Cerone (eds.), The Roles of Soft Law in Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2016).
35 Elspeth Guild and Stephanie Grant, ’Migration Governance in the UN: What is the Global Compact and What does it mean?’, Legal 
Studies Research Paper No. 252/2017, Queen Mary University of London, p. 16.
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SECTION 2: 
What are the Forms of UN International 
Agreements/Understandings and What is 
Their Legal Effect?   
Isobel Roele
This section addresses the question ‘What is a compact?’ by comparing the term with other 
terms for agreements used by the UN. Its principal conclusion is that the Global Compact 
for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (Global Compact for Migration ) is a political rather 
than a legal instrument, but that its purposes go beyond awareness-raising and virtue-casting 
and are likely to have indirect, and possibly deleterious, effects. The compact is intended 
to serve as a common framework for the ‘good governance’ of migration that will both 
guarantee minimum standards for migrants and facilitate international cooperation on migration 
challenges.36 Although unlikely to contain any binding legal obligations, its ‘principles, 
commitments and understandings’37 are intended to structure future action on migration 
and it is likely to be a major influence on the interpretation of existing legal instruments and 
the creation of new ones. They do this not as legal norms arising from political discourse, 
but as technical norms garnered from expert knowledge and institutional experience.
The political aspect of the Global Compact for Migration is less about process than form. 
It is intended as a means of signalling global commitment to dealing with migration. Unlike 
legal obligations, political commitments are not legally enforceable. Indeed, this seems to 
have been a condition of states’ participation in and support of the Global Compact for 
Migration. Nevertheless, legal enforcement is not the only route to implementation and the 
Global Compact for Migration comes with a host of non-legal implementation mechanisms. 
These ‘design elements’38 form an implementation framework39 that use non-binding norms 
based on technical and professional know-how to find the optimal mode of implementation. 
This sort of norm can be characterised as a hybrid norm, poised between the legal, 
the political and the technical. The engine of implementation, as it were, is not the threat 
of coercive enforcement but the difficulty of refusing offers of cooperation and assistance 
to make good on one’s promise. The UN has used such hybrid instruments with great 
frequency since the Millennium, particularly in the field of economic and social development 
and the term ‘compact’ captures precisely this interplay between commitment and technique.
What’s in a Name?
We should be chary of reading too much into the phrase ‘global compact’. In UN nego-
tiations, words are often chosen because of what they do not signify as much as for what 
they mean. It may be that states have chosen the term ‘compact’ precisely because it is 
little used and, therefore, does not bear the baggage of preconception. 
––––––––––––––    
36 This is clear from the 2017 report of the UN Special Representative for Migration, Peter Sutherland, UN Doc. A/71/28, para. 41
37 UN General Assembly, Modalities for the intergovernmental negotiations of the global compact for safe, orderly and regular migration, 
UN Doc. A/Res/71/280, 1
38 Andrew T. Guzman, ‘The Design of International Agreements’ 16(4) European Journal of International Law (2005) 579–612
39 UN General Assembly, Modalities for the intergovernmental negotiations of the global compact for safe, orderly and regular migration, 
UN Doc. A/Res/71/280, para. 2
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A preliminary point to make, given that the UN has six official languages and that many 
more are spoken in its 193 member states, is that ‘global compact’ is only the English term. 
Among the official languages, the French and Spanish renderings of ‘global compact’ are 
‘pacte mondiae’ and ‘pacto mundial’, respectively. Although not an official language of the 
UN, the text was also available in German which has the instrument as ‘globalen Paktes’. 
We might ask, then, why the phrase was rendered ‘global compact’ rather than ‘global 
pact’. The UN is not a stranger to the word ‘Pact’, which has been used on a number of 
occasions – including in the context of transnational organized crime in which the ‘Paris 
Pact’ was drafted to combat illicit flows from Afghanistan in May 2003. This ‘pact’ was a 
political commitment rather than a set of binding legal obligations.40 Another, better known 
‘Paris Pact’ is properly known as the ‘Paris Agreement’ in English and the ‘Accord de Paris’ 
in French. Much in the news, the reason this climate change instrument is often referred to 
as the ‘Paris Pact’ in the media is perhaps only that it alliterates. The International Labour 
Organization’s Global Jobs Pact of 2009 is described as a policy document, intended ‘to 
provide an internationally agreed basis for policy-making’ on unemployment.41
It is not clear why the English translation is ‘global compact’ rather than ‘global pact’. It may 
be that the wording is a deliberate allusion to Kofi Annan’s UN Global Compact, launched 
in 2005.42 This was an attempt to put networked governance theory into practice, bringing 
stakeholders (companies, academics, local networks) together. Its mandate is to “pro-
mote responsible business practices and UN values among the global business community 
and the UN System”.43  It is a public-private initiative and multi-stakeholder venture.44 It may 
be that using the word ‘compact’ rather than pact signals an intention to bring this sort of 
networked governance to bear on migration. Perhaps the French and Spanish translations 
(pacte mondial and pacto mundial) signify this intention. Certainly, the envisaged role of 
‘stakeholders’ in the compact suggests as much. Indeed, it seems that a non-UN inter-
governmental entity – the Global Forum on Migration and Development – already takes 
such an approach.45 Its website boasts policy tools, a ‘platform for partnerships’ and other 
‘networking’ devices,46 and primarily involves the sharing of best practices – a technique 
shared by the Global Compact for Migration process.47 This approach amounts to a sort of 
legerdemain whereby legitimating properties such as inclusiveness and plurality become 
conduits for technicality rather than political contestation.
UN General Assembly Instruments
Understanding the status of UNGA resolutions is important in ascertaining the legal effect 
of the Global Compact for Migration. The UN General Assembly (UNGA) acts through 
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42 See in general Ernst-Ulrich Petersman, ‘Time for a United Nations ‘Global Compact’ for Integrating Human Rights into the Law of 
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47 The use of this technique is widespread in the UN. See, for instance, the UN Security Council’s Counter-terrorism Committee which 
uses best practices to implement resolution 1373 (2001). See generally, Roele, “Disciplinary Power in the UN Counter-Terrorism Com-
mittee” 19(1) Journal of Conflict and Security Law (2014) 49-84.
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resolutions. Unlike those of the Security Council,48 its resolutions are not generally binding 
on UN member states, and it has no authority or independent means to coercively enforce 
them.49 UN member states are only obliged to ‘accept and carry out the decisions of the 
Security Council’ and not the UNGA.50 Having said that, the International Court of Justice 
has accepted that an Assembly resolution can have legal effect. For instance, the Court 
recognized that Assembly resolutions concerning budgetary matters can have binding 
effect because the Charter uses the mandatory phrase ‘expenses of the Organization shall 
be borne by the Members as apportioned by the General Assembly’.51 Nevertheless, the 
resolutions are generally seen as having only indirect law-making effect in the form of 
customary norms, either as evidence of opinio iuris or as constituting relevant state 
practice.52 Just because something is agreed by the UNGA in a resolution does not, then, 
make it legally binding.
However, not all UNGA resolutions are created equal. Procedural resolutions can be dis-
tinguished from substantive ones, for instance. Then again, resolutions passed without a 
vote – by consensus – can be distinguished from ‘important questions’ for which a 2/3 
majority is required.53  If resolutions are the maids-of-all-work of the General Assembly, it is 
vital to be able to distinguish the most from the least important. This is where the resolution 
as a vehicle for adopting or endorsing another instrument comes into its own. One of many 
international conventions the Assembly has adopted, the UN Convention on Transnational 
Organized Crime (UNTOC) in 2000,54 serves to explain the purpose of adoption. Urging 
states to become parties is only one reason the Assembly adopts conventions; another is 
that, as is the case with UNTOC, the Convention forms part of the UN architecture – in this 
case to be administered by the UN Office for Drugs and Crime. The Assembly cannot, of 
course, bypass the need for states to sign a treaty for it to become binding on them. It can, 
however, help to imbricate the treaty into UN efforts.
Another form of instrument the UNGA often incorporates into its resolutions is the 
declaration. On the face of it, there is no reason that the substance of the declaration could 
not simply be transposed into the text of the resolution. However, it seems that reminding 
readers of the circumstances in which a declaration was made – as in the case of the New 
York Declaration of September 2016 - can be a potent tool to raise its profile. Another good 
example of this is the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document.55 Although many high level 
dialogues are had in the UN, it is rare to get heads of state and government together as 
occurred in 2005, and adopting the outcome document as a text in its own right seemed 
to reflect the ‘once-in-a-generation’ feeling of the moment.
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48 When taken under Chapter VII. See Articles 25 and 48(1) of the UN Charter.
49 S.M. Schwebel, ‘The Effect of Resolutions of the UN General Assembly on Customary International Law’ 73 ASIL Proc. (1973) 301.
50 UN Charter, Article 25.
51 UN Charter, Article 17(2). See generally Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter) Advisory 
Opinion of 20 July 1962, ICJ Reports 1962, 151.
52 Rosalyn Higgins, ‘The United Nations and Law-Making: The Political Organs’ 64 ASIL Proc (1970) 39. 
53 UN Charter, Article 18(2).
54 UN Doc. A/Res/55/25.
55 UN Doc. A/RES/60/1
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In still other cases, the Assembly incorporates another instrument into its canon with the 
purpose of giving plenary endorsement to prolonged, complex process. A good example 
of this is the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.56 The process of creating this 
document, though it is far more complex and sprawling, is comparable to that of the Global 
Compact for Migration. The Agenda is the same sort of ‘bundling’ instrument as the Global 
Compact for Migration.57 Its process also involves multiple actors, is a cross-cutting issue, 
and is tinged with emergency and urgency and has made an enormous effort to include a 
multiplicity of stakeholders.
A Hybrid Instrument
There is a mismatch between the aspirations of the UN Special Representative for Migration 
and the stomach for action among UN member states. Although Sutherland hopes that the 
Global Compact on Migration may eventually pave the way for ‘new international norms and 
treaties’,58 there is a marked absence of legal language in the UNGA documents agreed by 
UN member states. Instead, their language is very much – as already suggested – the lang-
uage of policy frameworks and political commitments. It seems likely that a condition for 
the acceptability of the Global Compact for Migration project among the UN membership is 
that it is not legally binding. The paltry number of signatories to the International Convention 
on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, which 
was negotiated under the aegis of the UN and adopted by the UNGA in 1990, is a case in 
point.59 As Sutherland himself points out, there is entrenched disagreement among the UN 
membership about what safe, orderly and regular migration looks like.60  
Indeed, although migration has been on the UN radar since the mid-2000s when the 
Secretary General of the time, Kofi Annan, encouraged the UNGA to hold a High Level 
Dialogue on the matter,61  little progress was made between this moment, which established 
the agenda item ‘international migration and development’ and September 2016 and the 
New York Declaration in the intervening years. It appears to be that the crisis caused by the 
Syrian civil war is acting as a catalyst for action.
Had the UNGA intended to create a binding legal framework for future action, they would 
have agreed to negotiate a convention on migration or on one of the various aspects of 
migration singled out for action. Although migration is presented as a ‘multidimensional’ 
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56  UN Doc. A/RES/70/1 
57 Section 3.
58 UN Doc. A/71/28, para 87, op cit, Section I.
59 UN Doc A/RES/45/158 (1990). The Convention has just 51 parties, none from the Global North.
60 As UN Special Representative on Migration, Peter Sutherland wrote in his report UN Doc. A/71/28, ‘States tend to have quite diffe-
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61 This culminated in a resolution on International migration and development, UN Doc. A/Res/61/208
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and ‘cross-cutting’ issue, there is nothing inherent in this that would prevent a treaty being 
concluded. Existing examples include UNTOC and the Refugee Convention of 1951, which 
is administered by the UNHCR. Both instruments are framework treaties and have yielded 
subsequent protocols which are also legally binding.
Nevertheless, it is possible that the Global Compact for Migration could be a policy 
framework which might subsequently accommodate multilateral legal instruments. It is also 
possible that the norms in the Global Compact for Migration could be elevated to the status 
of positive international law in the form of customary international law. When international 
law norms are aspirational rather than positive obligations accompanied by enforcement 
measures, they form part of the lex ferenda. These so-called ‘soft law’ norms are thought to 
contain what the law ought to be rather than what the law is. They are political commitments 
that are often dismissed as ‘zombie policy’. Given that the way norms come into existence 
in public international law – through state consent – widespread acceptance of aspirational 
norms can be evidence of state practice constitutive of a customary international law.62
  
The Special Representative intends the Global Compact for Migration to represent ‘soft 
law’.63  However, in my opinion it would not do so as lex ferenda but as a form of technical 
norm that achieves implementation not through ‘hard’ enforcement mechanisms, but ‘soft’ 
implementation in the form of development assistance. Although not law in the sense of 
positive legal norms enforceable in international courts and tribunals, a Global Compact for 
Migration full of technical standards, commitments and principles could lead to domestic 
legislation, bilateral treaties, regional agreements and international instruments that contain 
binding legal norms. It is also likely that as well as stretching forwards towards future legal 
obligations, the Global Compact for Migration will stretch backwards in time to the interpre-
tation of existing legal instruments. The Compact thus acts as a sort of hub for the coordi-
nation and association of myriad activities and initiatives. At its most rudimental, this is what 
is suggested by the etymology of ‘compact’; the coming together of pacts.
Expertise and Experience
‘Compact’ also suggests a coming-together of actors. I have already mentioned this as 
regards the partnership model of the UN Global Compact. In the case of the Global 
Compact for Migration, this coming together is less of an inclusive political idea than a 
broad-knowledge-based technical one. Plural participation is valued not because it gives 
voice to conflicting perspectives, but because it adds detail and depth to a single under-
standing of migration. The UNGA envisages that a raft of non-state actors from specialized 
agencies and civil society will play a key role in the Global Compact for Migration process. 
These actors are described as ‘relevant stakeholders’ and this description seems to refer 
both to the fact that they are invested in the outcome (e.g. diaspora communities and 
migrant organizations) and that they have relevant experience and expertise (civil society 
organizations, academic institutions). In many cases, stakeholders are both affected and 
expert. The modalities resolution particularly emphasizes the importance of expertise and 
experience in crafting the document when it refers to the importance of ‘best practices’, as 
this suggests that the norms in the Global Compact for Migration will be concrete how-to 
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63 UN Doc. A/71/28, para. 86
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guidance and not abstract ‘what if’ aspirations. This is further suggested by the ‘technical 
and policy expertise’ role of the IOM in servicing the negotiations, and by the use of ‘expert 
panels’ in the first phase of the drafting process. The process only becomes political in the 
sense of intergovernmental negotiation in the third phase. Member states will discuss a 
draft that has been crafted on the basis of technical ‘inputs’.
There is a case for saying that the importance of stakeholders other than governments in 
the process of creating the Global Compact for Migration means that, even though it will 
not form part of binding international law, the Global Compact for Migration will nevertheless 
be a very potent instrument. If it is outside international law, the policy framework can 
contain agreements between non-state actors and technical guidelines developed by and 
addressed to those directly involved in migration. It may be, then, that the Compact forms 
an umbrella for a plethora of regulations, recommendations, standards and practices, guidelines, codes 
of conduct and accords. These sorts of documents are typically produced by speciali-
zed agencies and contain technical norms. For instance, the International Civil Aviation 
Organization’s Standards and Practices, the World Health Organization’s Regulations 
and the Financial Action Task Force’s Recommendations. The idea that the UN would pro-
vide a big tent to draw together and, ideally, harmonize disparate efforts in a long-term 
and multi-agency effort is entirely commensurate with its post-Millennium policy of building 
partnerships to perform its functions, rather than keeping them all in-house. In this, there is 
a parallel with – amongst others – the Global Plan of Action to Combat the Trafficking 
of Persons and the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. Both of these very different 
initiatives are designed to consolidate existing efforts within the UN and to build links with 
external agencies working towards the same ends. While this helps the UN ‘deliver as one’, 
it also waters down specific initiatives because each prong of the common effort must com-
promise in order to work together in harmony.
Conclusion
The inclusive nature of the Global Compact for Migration process is, on the face of it, a 
positive move towards inclusion and a plurality of voices. However, there is a tendency that 
the eventual document will have a lowest-common-denominator effect on human rights 
standards for migrants. For one, the higher the number of points of view to accommodate, 
the looser the norms become. For another, the fact that human rights organizations 
become one voice among many inevitably has the effect of diluting human rights norms and 
marginalizing human rights as a body of law. The worst case scenario is that wishy-washy 
human rights standards are included in the Global Compact for Migration as a fig-leaf for 
states to legitimate their current practices.
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SECTION 3: 
The Global Migration Compact and the Limits 
of ‘Package Deals’ for Migration Law and Policy
Marion Panizzon
This section infers from several negotiating techniques used towards drafting a Global 
Migration Compact with a focus on the issue-linkage, also known as the packaging app-
roach, what the final outcome might be. Engaging in a comparative assessment with 
competing use of “compacts” by international donors and the EU towards Jordan, we ar-
gue that “packaging” is of limited use in a field framed by individual rights and the universal 
claim of protection. Linkages are at similar loss, in this field, fraught with weak reciprocity 
among states. The EU concept of “compacts” seemingly sides with its pre-crisis partnership 
logic propagated in policy instruments such as the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility 
(GAMM) but at the same time bypasses the participatory rationale of EU neighbourhood 
policy action plans and reveals a top-down approach instead. The universality of human 
rights protection implies non-negotiable commitments which cannot be watered down by 
reciprocal deals. If human rights are taken seriously, the Global Migration Compact 
could incentivize separate, but interlinked treaties on specific aspects of migration, including 
return and labor market access quotas, standards on readmission procedures according 
to the “mini-multilateralism” paradigm, rather than act as a platform to launch a single, 
multilateral treaty on migration.
Compacts as Packages? Theorizing ‘Issue-Linkage’ in Migration
Issue-linkage often used identically with the “packaging approach”, is not quite a theory but 
rather a “machinery” or a “mechanism” advanced by legal theorists68  and political scientists69 
as a vehicle to incentive states to cooperate internationally on foreign policy areas for which 
global consensus remains out of reach, often because a reciprocal trade-off is difficult to 
reach.70 In the realm of international law, issue-linkage acts as a trust-building treaty-negotiating 
technique or a “bargaining tactic” that ensures that agreements are negotiated and parties 
remain in the agreements.71
 
Issue-linkage to other policy categories, or put differently “embedding” into a related, but 
more mature regulatory area, is one recipe to create the bargaining space for gathering 
global alliance, before addressing, in a subsequent step, the hot topic.72 In international 
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migration law and policy, issue-linkage is applied to overcome the “missing regime” 73 and 
other collective action challenges, including a fragmented 74 “piecemeal” law.75 Whereas 
issue-linkage is not free of risk, including exacerbating power asymmetries, which leads to 
a blurring of rights and policy overlaps which are subsequently difficult to “disentangle” 76, 
it can, if effectively tailored and holistically managed – be advanced as one selling point of 
the Jordan Compact.77 Issue-linkage has the further advantage of being accessible to most 
disciplines – law, political science and economics – so  that a packaging solution will even 
be more poly-valent.
The downside of linkage is how it creates overly complex governance structures and incoherent 
outcomes78 for blurring of rights and asymmetric bilateral deals driven by conditionality 
rather than reciprocity.79 Packaging builds trust, creates incentives to compromise, but can 
also blur lines, in particular for rights protection. With migrants “encountering” courts as in 
Hirsi Jamaa and Others v Italy, no. 27765/09 ECHR 2012 and Khlaifia and Others v Italy, 
no. 16483/12 ECHR 2017,80  it becomes more difficult for governments to strike deals on 
their expense (Turkey-EU statement; Italy-Libya bilateral agreements). Packaging visa to 
readmission or linking trade preferences to refugee employment becomes more difficult if 
rights are to be protected.81
Linkage in migration was used pre-crisis by countries including Switzerland to propagate 
a “whole-of-government” approach towards immigration policy formulation and Swiss 
migration partnerships towards third countries. Similarly, EU Mobility Partnerships, the 
Common Migration and Mobility Agendas and most recently the EU partnership priorities 
and compacts make use of it. Compacts by definition imply linkage or packaging; they 
figure as the ultimate form of linkage in international, regional and national migration law 
and policy. How have large movements of refugees and migrants provided new impulse 
for issue linkage and how linkage evolved, moving away from the migration-development-nexus 
of early days? 
Unlike trade, investment or health, which are policy categories displaying the kind of ‘global 
public goods’, quality that incentivizes international cooperation, for migration, with the 
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exception of few areas with free rider problems, including asylum and refugee protection, 
the same is not true.83 Packaging to non-migration policy categories, which is what 
“compacts” imply, is thus chosen to construct reciprocity in an area where there is often 
none.84 The EU-Jordan compact, to that effect, links goods trade to refugee employment 
as a solution for compensating Jordan’s crisis-ridden economy from some of the costs of 
the Syrian refugee intake. Behind the scenes, the “trade-refugee-deal” of the compact, 
however, also figures as a way to keep these refugees from reaching their country of 
choice – Europe. In this sense, issue-linkage in refugee policy comes at the cost of the 
human right to leave. Conversely, the trade-refugee labour linkage of the Jordan Compact 
creates livelihoods. It seems that profiling linkages – at least for refugee and migrants – is a 
highly controversial policy choice.85 
 
‘One-Size-Fits-All’ Versus ‘Mini-Multilateralism’: Why (Un)Pack a Compact?
The Global Compacts are an intermediate step in a negotiating process which could lead 
to the adoption of multilateral treaties. From negotiating techniques we can infer the final 
outcome and its meaning for migrant rights, multi-stakeholder participation, and other good 
governance questions. Issue-linkage and packaging solutions are negotiating techniques 
which ultimately aim at a multilateral solution, a one-size-fits-all approach or package deal 
mirroring a reciprocal give and take. Within the process of negotiating the Global Compact 
for Migration, a central question is how much policy space there should be for customizing 
policy solutions towards safe, regular and orderly migration and thus to “unpack”.86 This 
dichotomy between a one-size for all and tailor-made solutions, the later which enable 
pick-and-chose, opt-outs and opt-ins, is well-known from EU external dimensions of 
migration law. The Sutherland Report endorses “mini-multilateralism”, defined as 
collecting best practices around a specific issue area, which are in a second step, tested 
as pilots among a group of like-minded states, before multilateral support and, ideally, 
consensus is sought. 
The coming into being of the UN Global Compacts follows a top-down process, initiated by 
two country co-facilitators, in this case, Mexico (Ambassador José Juan Gomez Camacho) 
and Switzerland (Ambassador Jürg Lauber). This choice pre-determines an outcome whic 
h is driven by state preferences, sectoral and actor-specific interests. Although the drafters 
of the pre-negotiations reports, the co-facilitators and the UN administrative support team, 
claim this is a state-led, UN-assisted discourse which will require a General Assembly vote 
of approval, the fact that initiation and guidance is provided by the co-facilitators, that key 
strategic documents, such as the Sutherland Report or the Modalities document 87 and 
certain thematic meeting reports, are prepared by a group of individuals around the 
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87 A Modalities document was circulated on 22 December 2016: http://www.un.org/pga/71/wp-content/uploads/sites/40/2015/08/moda-
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process taking place outside the precepts of formal inter-governmentalism. The UN Global 
Compact for Migration process shares as discussed, some similarities with the multiple 
rounds of negotiations, which eventually transformed the GATT 1947 into the WTO, but it 
does not directly compare to these.88 On the other hand, the UN Global Compact for Migration 
opens to non-state participation, since during the 12 thematic meetings held in 2017, as 
well as the stakeholder meetings held during the pre-drafting stage, non-state organizations, 
including academia, may have a voice by accrediting with the UN. Nonetheless, a 
multi-stakeholder participation is kept formally out of the negotiation process, ensuring that 
the inclusion of migrants’ voices are a myth rather than a reality.89  
To what extent does the UN Global Compact profile a packaging approach and where 
are the limits? Firstly, it is clear that issue-linkage as a flexibility strategy encourages cross 
thematic fertilization among migration (and refugee) policy. This is important for a field like 
migration, where compromise is difficult to achieve as divides between perceived sending, 
host and transit communities run deep and “unwanted” migration becomes a highly politi-
cized category. The NY Declaration itself links short-term humanitarian relief and emergency 
interventions with medium-term protection needs and long-term livelihood strategies.
The Sutherland Report, however, notes that compacts ought to lead to “the conclusion of 
new, issue-specific treaties”,90  which means even more fragmentation and less coherence, 
unless an umbrella treaty would provide a framework. The Sutherland Report’s emphasis 
on “issue-specific” means that the Special Representative of the Secretary General and 
the General Migration Group are opposed to “packaging solutions” and “cross-sectoral 
bargaining”, as was undertaken by developing with industrialized countries during the 
Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations, to build up the necessary reciprocity for 
negotiating the so-called “single undertaking” of the WTO Marrakech agreement. In that 
case, packaging solutions acted as an umbrella to the grand bargain between intellectual 
property, trade in services and goods, including with the Global South. Instead, the negoti-
ating technique chosen for the Global Migration Compact is “mini-multilateralism”, defined 
as seeking a common denominator around a single issue, such as “vulnerable situations; 
abusive recruitment processes; or international transfers of funds and benefits”.91 These 
single issues are then discussed among interested States before multilateralizing towards 
all UN Member States in the form of a self-contained treaty or agreement on each specific 
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issue. In what in essence amounts to a three-step process, as the Sutherland Report 
indicates, the function of a compact is one of a stepping stone: “The global compact could 
bundle agreed norms and principles into a global framework agreement with both binding 
and non-binding elements and identify areas in which States seek to work towards the 
conclusion of new international norms and treaties.” 92 Its work is clearly to not go beyond 
co-facilitating a state-led process of identification of issue areas suitable for multilateralism, 
as was repeatedly stated in the “procedural note for the third informal thematic session” 
on international cooperation and governance of migration in all its dimensions including at 
borders, on transit, entry, return, readmission, integration and reintegration.93
 
Similarly, the EU Partnership Framework proposes “coherent and tailored” partnerships or 
“country packages” to resolve the delivery gap haunting EU readmission agreements. The 
EU Common Agendas for Migration and Mobility,94 Compacts and Partnerships, are all tools 
to “informalize” and thus lessen the legal density pressuring sending countries into disliked 
and eventually unenforced readmission agreements. The EU approach, which Switzerland 
for example has been replicating with its “Migration partnerships”, is a sequential one, 
providing for the conclusion of non-binding frameworks or sub-ministerial inter-agency 
technical cooperation first, before negotiating a fully-fledged EU readmission agreement.95
  
The sequencing strategy inherent in EU migration policy and issue-specific customization 
inherent in it, are key flexibility tools which can advance prospects of enforcement and 
increase the likelihood of voluntary returns. On the downside, informalization risks watering 
down non-refoulement guarantees and other rights. The Global Compacts seem to 
pursue a similar strategy of sequencing the process, with a first informal phase of thematic 
meetings and multi-stakeholder meetings each summarized by “notes” from the office of 
the Special Representative of the Secretary General Louise Arbour, complemented by a 
Zero-Draft drafted by the co-facilitators, upon which states engage in a second phase of 
negotiations. 
The Global Compact for Migration posits the following advantages in “flexibility”:
 
 –  Acknowledgement that not all of migration policy features “hard” law 
  agreements and treaties;
 –  Allowing competing “ethos” (voluntarism, humanitarianism and managerialism) to  
  be co-joined and lessen pressure on states to multilateralize;
 – Bottom-up approaches like regional consultative processes co-exist alongside  
  co-facilitated process of the Global Compact for Migration;
 –  Migration flows are usually “mixed” and this diversity needs to play out in 
  policy solutions;
 –  Validation of the local and subnational layers of migration law-making;
 –  Acknowledgement that categorization into host, home, transit countries may run  
  counter to fair-distribution of benefits regarding migration;
–––––––––––––– 




95 EU Partnership Framework, 7 June 2016, COM (2016) 385 final, pp. 6-7.
22
Legal Density of Compacts– ‘Between a Rock and a Hard Place’ 96 
A distinctive trait of Compacts is their “hybridity” in terms of legal density, as discussed by 
Isobel Roele in the section above. Compacts strike a middle ground between the hard law 
of a multilateral treaty or bilateral agreement and the soft law of declarations, recommendations, 
best practices, and understandings.97 The hybridity of compacts extends beyond their legal 
density or choice of negotiating technique. Ambivalence also concerns the governance 
modality of Compacts: less constraining than an agreement, but a step beyond the sof-
ter understandings, recommendations, guidelines or other labels for best practices, which 
characterize pre-New York millennial migration outputs at the global level, including the 
GCIM Commission’s common understandings (2015), the outputs of the UN HLDs on 
migration and development since 2009, the Berne Initiative’s International Agenda on Migration 
Management (IAMM), but also point 10.7 of the Sustainable Development Agenda 2030. 
Indeed, the pre-negotiation process of the Global Compact for Migration so far, seems to 
combine multi-stakeholder with thematic informal meetings, held at alternating UN head-
quarters, from Geneva or New York to Vienna. Both the multi-stakeholder and thematic 
meetings aim to collect best practices on various issue areas of migration to feed into 
a Zero Draft, with the goal to multi-lateralize those issues over which consensus can be 
achieved by concluding issue-specific treaties. However, the process is open-ended in 
terms of the conclusion of the global framework agreement to serve as an umbrella or to 
what extent certain areas will remain soft law.98
Compacts contain a further “hybrid” moment, in the sense of an “intertemporal” component. 
The series of “informal multi-stakeholder and thematic meetings” leading to the Compact 
is only the intermediate goal. The more ultimate one is to obtain a cluster of issue-specific 
multilateral treaties, and, in an even longer-term horizon, a “global framework agreement” 
to hold these thematic treaties together.99  It is no coincidence that the Sutherland Report’s 
key architect, Sir Peter Sutherland, had something similar in mind to the WTO Marrakech 
agreement he helped to conceive back in 1994, as the last Secretary General of General 
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) and first Director General of what became the World 
Trade Organisation agreement (WTO), the so-called WTO constitution, spanning over the 
GATT 1947, the GATS100 and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement and giving birth to the WTO as an international organi-
zation. Yet, at this stage it remains unclear to what extent such a “global migration framework 
agreement” would be monitoring authority and holding powers of judicial review.
–––––––––––––– 
96 An idiom used to describe the challenge of a dilemma: two solutions are in sight, but neither is desirable or feasible; it inspired the 
Rolling Stones to a song, and Petros Mavroidis to an article on the role of remedies in the WTO Remedies in the WTO legal system: 
between a rock and a hard place; (11(4) EJIL (2000) 763-813), which is highly contested, since they are neither foreseen by the WTO 
treaties nor prospectively useful as a trade sanction. In the end, effectiveness, as the way out of dilemma, including of “package deals” 
is about power of persuasion.
97 See Section 1.
98 Guild and Grant 2017 12-15.
99 Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Migration (Sutherland Report), UN Doc. A/71/728 of 28 December 
2016 ; para. 87.
100 General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).
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As a governance tool, the Global Compact for Migration aspires clearly to fulfilling “good” go-
vernance rationales, including accountability, participation of civil society organisations, migrants 
and non-governmental organisations, and rights-based policies, alongside multi-layered 
governance aspirations, including to increase the intersectionality among socio-spatial layers to 
improve, by implementing subsidiarity, the efficiency, burden-sharing and solidarity among govern-
mental actors at global, regional and local levels.101 Governance thus aims to increase 
the coherence among actors,102 but also the coordination among themes and thus aspires 
to similar package deals, as the EU Partnership Framework propagates between irregular 
and regular migration through a mix of “positive and negative” incentives.103 Unlike “partnership 
approaches”, the UN Global Migration Compact strives for an even more comprehensive 
bundling, profiling for the first time in this explicit and unambiguous manner, human rights, 
vulnerability protection.
Out of an attempt to “manage” the refugee “crisis”, several regional and international 
compacts have emerged.104 Among these, the EU-Jordan Compact of 2016 features a high 
diversity of linkages, spanning from refugee employment for visa facilitation, labour, trade, 
development and even investment. The EU commitments, however, were preceded by an 
international donor conference. The following section dissects how “linkage” has worked in 
these compacts and to what migration and refugee was linked to and at whose expense. 
The International Compact for Jordan: A Multi-stakeholder Package
At the Syrian donor conference in London in 2016, key EU Member States affected by the 
large flows of refugees and migrants – Germany, Norway and the UK, together with Kuwait 
and Qatar – and non-state actors, including the EU, the World Bank and other multilateral 
donors, came up with international “commitments” for a “compact” with Jordan. The 
Conference held a second round of pledging on 5 April 2017 in Brussels.105  It was at this 
conference that the concept, which had been developed by two academics, Alex Betts and 
Paul Collyer, was applied in practice.106 The Compact “compensates” two frontline transit 
countries, Jordan and Lebanon, for keeping Syrian refugees in the region, which is per-
ceived as the more humane and at the same time less resource-intensive solution. The 
international compact is an unprecedented “package deal” – actor-wise and in terms of 
the policy mix involved.107 For the first time, refugees living in formal camps are to be given 
employment, at the expense of exercising their right to leave any country (Art. 13(2) Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights) and to freely move to their country of asylum of their choice. 
In return, host communities in Lebanon and Jordan are compensated for the cost of 
hosting foreign populations – albeit  the 9 billion euros raised at the London event are 
limited to Syrian refugees – in their volatile and fragile economies. Behind the compact was 
–––––––––––––– 
101 Global Migration Group (GMG) Input to the Secretary-General’s Issue Brief Theme #3: International cooperation and governance of 
migration in all its dimensions including at borders, on transit, entry, return, readmission, integration and reintegration, May 2017.
102 Defined as including state and civil society but not migrants themselves.
103 Céline Bauloz, ‘The EU Migration Partnership Framework: an External Solution to the Crisis?’, 31 January 2017, EU Immigration and 
Asylum Law Blog.
104 Etienne Piguet, ‘The “Migration Crisis” in Europe: An Interpretation, NCCR on the Move’, Blogpost 22 June 2017, http://blog.
nccr-onthemove.ch/the-migration-crisis-in-europe-an-interpretation/?lang=de.
105 The 4 February 2016 London donor conference is officially called “Supporting Syria and the Region” http://data.consilium.europa.eu/
doc/document/ST-12384-2016-ADD-1/en/pdf s.12
106 Paul Collier and Alex Betts, ‘Why Denying Refugees the Right to Work is a Catastrophic Error, 22 March 2017, https://www.theguardi-
an.com/world/2017/mar/22/why-denying-refugees-the-right-to-work-is-a-catastrophic-error.
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the idea that stepping up Middle Eastern countries’ export potential by relaxing their rules of 
origin with a view to boost exports of goods manufactured there with at least 25% refugee 
labour into the EU could be lined up with the EU interests in enforcing the externalization of 
EU borders. This is the objective of the EU regarding Jordan and Lebanon. Implementation 
would occur via secondary measures adopted by the EU-Association Councils. 
The Compacts in EU External Migration Policy: Rivalry with Partnerships? 
In EU policy, Jean-Claude Trichet, former EU Central Bank president, had coined the term 
“compact” for the first time, as another label for the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and 
Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union of 2 March 2012; also referred to as 
TSCG or Fiscal Stability Treaty. Under that “compact”, signatory EU Member States were 
urged to balance their national budgets with the convergence criteria, i.e. be in line with or 
feature a surplus according to an EU definition.108 The EU Migration Compacts are a very 
similar tool, also responding to crisis but falling short of culminating in a durable, long-term, 
legally binding solution. Instead, the Jordan Compact offers time-limited trade preferences 
and access to fiscal aid until 2018; the one with Lebanon until 2020.
In 2015, the Valletta Summit and the ensuing EU Agenda 2015 and 2017 Framework 
Partnership endorsed a “multi-policy” dimension. The EU Compacts, officially labelled the 
Partnership Priorities to which a Compact is annexed to, pursue this policy.109 The Part-
nership Framework on migration with third countries under the European Agenda on 
Migration perceive compacts as a follow-up to the Common Agendas on Migration and Mo-
bility (CAMM) according to which the EU can sign compacts with third countries, which can 
also be precursors to more fully-fledged and legally binding readmission agreements later.110 
EU Compacts build on pre-existing EU-Association agreements, but fall short of modifying 
them, since modification would involve the EU Parliament and take too much time. Com-
pacts are conceived as “crisis” intervention mechanisms to compensate host communities 
for a large and sudden intake of refugees. They have notably relieved the economies of Jordan 
and Lebanon of some of the costs of hosting Syrian refugees by granting more favourable 
export opportunities for merchandize produced by 25% refugee labour, but have left out 
Iraqi and Palestinian or refugees from the Horn of Africa from the deal.111 The compact modi-
fies Jordan’s eligibility status under its EU Association Agreement from the General System 
of Preferences Plus (GSP+) to an “Everything-but-Arms” status according to WTO rules. 
However, the EU-Association Council refrained from modifying the text of the Association 
Agreement because the compact is considered a time-limited deal only.112 The EU Compact 
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107  Katharina Lenner, ‘The politics of pledging: reflections on the London donors conference for Syria’, Migration Policy Center Policy 
Brief 2016/3, Florence : European University Institute.
108 The Czech Republic, Croatia, the UK opted out; Romania, Bulgaria and Denmark opted in.
109 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, The European Council, The Council and the European Investment 
Bank Partnership Framework with third countries under the European Agenda on Migration, 7 June 2016, COM(2016) 385 final.
110 EU Commission, Annex to the Joint Proposal for a Council Decision on the Union Position within the Association Council set up by 
the EU-Mediterranean Association Agreement establishing an association between the EU, its Member States and Jordan with regard 
to the EU-Jordan Partnership Priorities and Annexed Compact of 20 September 2016, http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/
ST-12384-2016-ADD-1/en/pdf
111 Marion Panizzon, ‘Trade and Migration Linkage Re-invented: The EU-Jordan Compact and Refugee Employment’, in Sergio Carrera, 
Elspeth Guild and Marco Stefan, The EU External Dimension of Migration Policy, TRANSMIC and CEPS (forthcoming).
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for Jordan mirrors the international compact for Jordan agreed to at the London donor 
conference. Rather than “subcontracting” to international organizations (including IOM 
and UNHCR),113 the EU is inversely aligning its policy priorities in Jordan, in particular to the 
international commitments agreed upon in London, in a process of “inverse diffusion”. As the 
EU Commission notes, Compacts are “fluid processes” from which a “formal” international 
agreement can “flow”.114 In the case of Jordan such a finalization is yet to be seen. Similarly, 
the Sutherland Report notes that the Global Migration Compact is a precursor to “new, iss-
ue-specific” treaties” and that the process “can help support States to move from informal 
processes to the conclusion of formal treaties”. Partnerships (Swiss, French, EU) in return, 
are yearly reviewed by a committee, which can add or remove elements to the deal (e.g. 
anti-trafficking programs, labour market access quotas, professions where economic needs 
tests are eliminated or relaxed) but without the expectation that someday there will be a 
spill-over into an agreement or treaty. As important discursive elements of an intensifying 
North-South dialogue among host-sending communities, EU partnerships are platforms to 
follow-up on ENP action plans.115 Conversely, the EU Association Council for Jordan announ-
ced that the EU-Jordan Compact and the EU Partnership Priorities to which they are annexed 
to replace ENP action plans.  Whereas the EU Mobility-partnerships emerge bottom-up among 
host country, interested EU member states and the EU Commission,116  the Compacts seem 
to overturn, the participatory legitimacy of the EU Mobility partnerships, by excluding the 
EU Commission or the EU Parliament as parties to the compacts, and expressly 
bypassing the logic of related EU migration instruments, including the ENP Action Plans, 
which they “replace”. 
–––––––––––––– 
112 Annex to a Joint Proposal for a Council Decision on the Union Position within the Association Council set up by the Euro-Mediterra-
nean Agreement of 20 September 2016: http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-12384-2016-ADD-1/en/pdf
113 Sandra Lavenex ‘Multilevelling EU external governance: the role of international organizations in the diffusion of EU migration policies’ 
42(4)  Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 554-570.
114 Factsheet on Partnership Framework on Migration, available at:  https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/factsheet_ec_format_migra-
tion_partnership_framework_update_2.pdf
115 EU Commission, Annex to a Joint Proposal for a Council Decision on the EU Partnership Priorities for Jordan, JOIN 2016 41 final, 19 
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116 Natasja Reslow, ‘Deciding on EU External Migration Policy, The Member States and the Mobility Partnerships’, 34(3) Journal of 
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actors and their priorities’, Brussels, 2016.
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Conclusion
Not all definitions of compacts mean the same thing. Nor are all type of “compacts” 
– global, regional or international – meant  to be “package deals”, negotiated to obtain a 
“one-size-fits-all” common denominator among host, sending and transit countries. Text 
analysis combined with semi-structured expert interviews of the UN informal thematic 
meetings reveal that what is labelled a “compact” in UN discourse differs widely from what 
the EU considers to be a “compact”. Yet, there is multi-levelling between the EU Jordan 
Compact and the commitments by the international community at the “Protecting Syria and 
the Region” Paris (2016) and Brussels (2017) conferences for Jordan. All “compacts” seem 
rooted in “ad hocism” to resolve the “migration crisis”. Whereas the Global Compact for 
Migration is a by-product of UN facilitated, state-led process, the international Jordan com-
pact is the product of multi-stakeholder participation, while the EU Jordan compact builds 
on a rich history of pre-existing EU association agreements, European Neighbourhood 
Policy Action Plans, and Mobility partnerships which it sidesteps or modifies.
Secondly, the UN Global Compact process is opposed to packaging solutions and clearly refra-
ins from straightjacketing states into one-size-fits-all solution. If at all, the UN Compacts seem 
more likely to stand as an intermediate step within a negotiating process labelled “mini-mul-
tilateralism”, which eventually leads like-minded states to adopt a series of area-specific 
treaties. Eventually, the UN Global Compact could lead to a “global framework agreement” 
monitoring with both binding and non-binding the various issue-specific treaties. 
Regardless of differences in negotiating techniques, EU and Global compacts propose 
“in-between” solutions – modifying ex post action plans, dialogues, agreements, facilitating 
an ex ante binding agreement, and providing an intermediate legal solution. 
In conclusion, the packaging approach might have worked to enhance the mutual sup-
portiveness of trade in goods and services with investment, intellectual property rights and 
environmental protection. Yet, as a “tit-for-tat” paradigm, linkage ultimately fails where indi-
vidual rights protection is at stake, as in migration or where reciprocity is weak, as between 
migrant sending, receiving states.
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SECTION 4: 
The Migration Partnership Framework and the 
EU-Turkey Deal: Lessons for the Global Compact on 
Migration Process? *
Violeta Moreno-Lax
The EU has been experimenting in recent years with ‘softified’, inter-governmental 
non-treaty formulas in its relations with the wider world in several domains, particularly 
with regards to migration and border management, which have had the effect (in practice) 
of divesting migrants of key fundamental rights, despite their positivisation in legally-biding 
instruments (including, not least, the European Convention on Human Rights). The Migration 
Partnership Framework (MPF), put forward by the European Commission in June 2016,117 
and the so-called EU-Turkey ‘deal’, concluded in March 2016,118  are cases in point. They 
provide illuminating examples of what such processes may lead to – not only for pre-existing 
inter-state commitments, but most importantly also in terms of the related erosion of 
migrants’ legal protections they have entailed. The turns and bumps encountered on the 
road offer valuable lessons to be learnt, indicating the way (and paths to be avoided) in the 
negotiations shaping the future content of the Global Compact for Migration at the UN level 
The MPF as New EU External Relations Template 
As already noted in the preceding sections, the MPF has been wholeheartedly embraced 
by the European Council as the new template for EU external relations.119  The document 
comes to de facto replace and modernise earlier strategies guiding interaction with third 
countries, including the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM).120  But, in com-
parison, the MPF exchanges the more participatory, bottom-up approach governing EU 
Mobility Partnerships121 with a top-down, classic conditionality-prone drive that also excludes 
EU democratic oversight.122
The proclaimed objectives of the MPF are similar to those pursued by the past GAMM 
framework. At face value, they both concentrate on strengthening links with non-EU part-
ners to better manage (or contain unwanted) migration. Short-term actions are presumably 
targeted at saving lives and rescuing migrants at sea and in the desert; at dismantling 
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* This section is partly based on V. Moreno-Lax and M. Giuffré, ‘The Raise of Consensual Containment: From ‘Contactless Control’ 
to ‘Contactless Responsibility’ for Forced Migration Flows’, S. Juss (ed.), Research Handbook on International Refugee Law (Edward 
Elgar, forthcoming). An advance copy is available at: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=3009331>.
117 Establishing a new Partnership Framework with third countries under the European Agenda on Migration, COM(2016) 385 final, 7 
June 2016.
118 EU-Turkey Statement, 18 Mar. 2017, available at: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18-eu-turkey-sta-
tement/>. 
119 European Council Conclusions, 28 June 2016, at: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/press-releases-pdf/2016/6/47244643506_en.pdf>.
120 The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility, COM(2011) 743 final, 18 Nov. 2011.
121 Natasja Reslow, ‘Deciding on EU External Migration Policy: The Member States and the Mobility Partnerships’ (2015) 34 Journal of 
European Integration 223. 
122 Sergio Carrera, R. Radescu and Natasja Reslow, EU External Migration Policies: A Preliminary Mapping of the Instruments, the 
Actors and their Priorities, EURA-NET Project Report (Brussels, 2015).
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traffickers and smugglers’ rings; increasing returns of irregulars and overstayers; and, in 
theory, also (like the Global Compact on Migration) at opening up legal pathways to countries 
of destination. In the long-term, the declared main ambition is to tackle the root causes of 
irregular migration to the EU by delivering development support to partner countries. And 
on the ground, both also focus (disproportionately) on combatting ‘illegal migration’, rather 
than adopting a more balanced, ‘triple win’, comprehensive approach.
The key difference between the two is the plainness with which the ‘stick-and-carrot’ 
approach to negotiations is put on the table by the MPF 123 – perhaps emboldened by the 
‘crisis’ climate prevailing since 2015. While the GAMM used the language of ‘partnership’ in 
a conciliatory, diplomatic way – echoing the text of Article 78 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the EU (TFEU) and Article 21 of the Treaty on the EU (TEU), the MPF is much more straight-
forward in acknowledging its bases in ‘effective incentives and adequate conditionality’, 
subjecting any eventual ‘partnership’ between the EU and third countries explicitly to 
‘cooperation on readmission and return [as] a key test’.124 The EU and its Member States 
also make development cooperation openly subordinate to third countries’ effective implementation 
of exit controls, so as to prevent departures and halt new arrivals onto EU territory. The Malta 
Declaration, building on the MPF, makes this abundantly clear with regard to the external 
aspects of migration policy and the Central-Mediterranean route.125 
It is agreed that both the Malta Declaration and the MPF take inspiration from the 
EU-Turkey ‘deal’ (or ‘Statement’ as is officially referred to),126 which aimed to reinvigorate 
– and simultaneously also ‘softify’ – the implementation of reciprocal (hard law) commit-
ments ensuing from the EU-Turkey Readmission Treaty of 2014,127 sidelining participation 
(and control by) the European Parliament and the European Commission. A focus on the 
content and effects of the deal’s application in practice is therefore justified as emblematic of 
this ‘new turn’ towards the informalisation (and re-inter-governmentalisation) of international 
relations, witnessed also on the global scene that preceding sections have highlighted.
The EU-Turkey Deal and the Informalisation of Legal Commitments
The EU-Turkey deal, reached on 18 March 2016, takes the form of a press ‘Statement’ 
intended not to produce (at least formally) any legally binding effects. The key was to make 
Turkey accept – as it was understood it should, under the normal working of the EU-Turkey 
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123 Céline Bauloz, The EU Migration Partnership Framework: an External Solution to the Crisis?, (EU Immigration and Asylum Law Blog, 
31 January 2017), available at: <http://eumigrationlawblog.eu/the-eu-migration-partnership-framework-an-external-solution-to-the-crisis/>
124 Council of the EU, External aspects of migration - Monitoring results, 4 Jul 2016, at: <http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/
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126 EU-Turkey Statement (n 120). 
127 Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Turkey on the readmission of persons residing without authorisation, 
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Readmission Agreement – the ‘rapid return of all migrants not in need of international pro-
tection crossing from Turkey to Greece and to take back all irregular migrants intercepted 
in Turkish waters’.128  The text establishes that migrants arriving in Greece must be registered 
and their asylum applications processed in accordance with the EU Asylum Procedures 
Directive 2013/32/EU.129 Furthermore, the Statement pledges that for every Syrian readmit-
ted to Turkey from Greece, another Syrian will be resettled from Turkey to the EU, prioritizing 
those who may have not previously entered or attempted to enter the EU irregularly. Turkey 
also undertook to adopt any measures necessary to prevent new irregular arrivals on Greek 
islands and to cooperate with the EU to that effect. In return, EU Member States promised 
to accelerate the visa liberalization roadmap, to reinvigorate the EU accession process, and 
committed to transfer EUR 6 billion to Turkey under a dedicated Facility for Refugees.
A subsequent Joint Action Plan for the implementation of certain key provisions of the 
Statement was adopted with the objective of speeding up its application – at  the expense 
of migrant rights. Indeed, the text insists on shortening processing times of asylum claims, 
‘limiting appeal steps’, increasing safety, security and ‘detention capacities’ on the islands, 
accelerating relocation and returns, and sealing the Greek northern borders to avoid secon-
dary movements.130   If followed to the letter, Greece will be turned into a pre-removal/return 
processing hub for the entire EU, with the ‘hotspots’ on the islands serving as mass deten-
tion sites within the deal’s scheme, in disregard of basic fundamental rights guarantees.131 
 
On its part, Turkey has taken back 1,798 persons from the Greek islands and halted the 
exit of most migrants since the conclusion of the deal – going from a daily average rate of 
11,428 arrivals to just 52 – although only 6,254 Syrian refugees have been resettled under 
the ‘one for one’ formula foreseen in the Statement over the same period.132
  
The presumption is that Turkey is a ‘safe third country’ for returns from Greece. However, 
Turkey maintains a geographical limitation to the 1951 Refugee Convention, thereby 
denying any possibility to request and receive protection qua Convention refugees to 
anyone holding the nationality of a non-European country. These persons can only obtain 
recognition as ‘conditional refugees’, on a temporary basis, under the Turkish Law on 
Foreigners and International Protection of 2014.133 This is one principal reason why the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe,134 as well as a host of NGOs and 
scholars,135  have challenged the labelling of Turkey as a ‘safe third country’.136
Whereas Turkey is currently hosting Syrian refugees in excess of the 2.9 million officially 
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128  EU-Turkey Statement (n 120).
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registered,137 it is also well known that migrants (whether ‘voluntary’ or ‘forced’) are routinely 
mistreated, including in pre-removal centres where they are arbitrarily detained to impede 
their departure (or flight) to Greece.138
The situation in-country is equally problematic. In fact, reliable sources have reported that 
‘Turkish border guards are shooting and beating Syrian asylum seekers trying to reach 
Turkey’.139 The Turkish-Syrian border is closed and there are plans for a new border wall to 
prevent crossings.140 Erdogan’s authorities have allegedly contributed to the degradation of 
the situation in Syria by bombing Kurdish militia, disregarding risks for civilians,141 making 
Turkey’s consideration as a ‘safe third country’ for forced migrants utterly unwarranted, 
given notorious risks of direct and indirect refoulement.
In fact, illegal mass returns to Syria have been reported to be on the rise since the conclu-
sion of the EU-Turkey deal.142 Turkey has recently concluded 14 readmission agreements 
with countries of origin of migrants and asylum seekers, thereby multiplying the risk of 
forced repatriation in violation of human rights. Actually, Turkey is already returning people 
(whether formally or informally) back to Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, and Syria, where they 
run a real risk of persecution and extreme danger to their lives.143  Erdogan’s government is 
also restricting Turkish entry-visa requirements and negotiating further readmission treaties 
with several refugee-producing countries, as a means to implement commitments towards 
the EU according to the ‘deal’.
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All the above notwithstanding, in March 2017, the General Court of the CJEU disclaimed juris-
diction to hear and determine the actions of annulment brought by three asylum seekers 
against the EU-Turkey Statement.144 In the respective Orders it served to the claimants, the 
General Court considered that the press release containing the Statement is solely attributable 
to the Heads of State or Government of the Member States of the EU, who met with the 
Turkish Prime Minister on 18 March 2016, and not to the European Council itself. So, in the 
absence of a (formal) act traceable back to any European institution, the Court considered 
not to have competence to adjudicate the case.
 
This hyper-formalistic reading of the Court leaves several key questions unanswered and 
leaves migrants and refugees at the mercy of whatever consequences the deal may lead to. 
In particular, it is unclear whether the EU Member States had the power, in the first place, to 
act (completely outside the EU framework) in a matter, which was already thoroughly regu-
lated by the EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement. One may wonder whether the principle of 
pre-emption did not impede a subsequent parallel (if informal) regulation of the exact same 
subject matter by the Member States acting qua (independent) actors of international law, 
as the General Court appeared to imply. Also doubtful is the inference that Member States, 
acting qua autonomous sovereigns, had the capacity to commit ‘the EU’ to re-energising 
accession negotiations, promising visa facilitation, or creating a Refugee Facility out of the 
EU budget, if they were indeed acting in their autonomous international law competence.
But, beyond the discussion on the nature and legal character of the deal and its potential 
violation of EU treaty-making rules,145  the most perilous development is the lack of any in-
vestigation by the Court of the material content and, especially, the effects of the measu-
res adopted under the umbrella of the ‘deal’, purportedly to implement the EU-Turkey 
Readmission Treaty and tackle the ‘refugee crisis’. The impact of the joint endeavour by 
the EU and Turkey to halt arrivals onto Greek soil on the rights of migrants was completely 
ignored by the Luxembourg judges.146 No regard was had to the non-refoulement protec-
tions, the right to asylum, the prohibition of collective expulsion, or the freedom to leave any 
country including one’s own inscribed in international and EU law.147 
Putting ‘Deals’ (and ‘Compacts’) to the Test: The Dilution of Hard-Law Commitments via 
Soft-Law Implementation
The lessons to extract from the MPF and its archetypical incarnation in the EU-Turkey deal 
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may be an anti-climax to diplomatic negotiators taking part in the different rounds of 
conversations that will precede the adoption of the Global Compact for Migration. But they 
must be taken into account nonetheless.
The softification of hard-law commitments into low-regulation, second-range implementing 
documents that the EU strategy represents should ring alarm bells in Geneva, New York 
and elsewhere. The result of the EU-Turkey deal on the ground has been a fast dilution of 
legal obligations and concomitant responsibilities, leaving aside the damning bypassing 
of democratic scrutiny by the European Parliament through the short-circuiting of EU 
treaty-making rules, as enshrined in Article 218 TFEU. The solution reached by the one and 
only final arbiter of EU law (as per Article 19 TEU) is also discouraging on the whole. It feeds 
legal uncertainty and circumvents EU fundamental rights guarantees, thus heightening the 
risk of violations, dispossessing those concerned of the procedural and judicial protections 
inherent in legally-binding instruments, according to the rule of law.148
 
If the Global Compact takes the same route, it is hard not to forecast a similar (disastrous) 
outcome, retrogressing to times prior to the UDHR. A return to ‘pure’, hegemonic forms 
of inter-governmentalism that ignore the posterior evolution of international law, especially 
after human rights were introduced in legally-binding form, would amount to the dismantling 
of the international system as we currently know it, leading to the (illegitimate) de-sub-
jectivisation of the individual as an actor and holder of international entitlements. The voice, 
interests, and rights of migrants must be kept at the centre of any negotiations regarding 
international mobility, if the core principles of the international legal system are to be preserved150
. 
While recognising the difficulties attached to global migration management, ‘problems with 
[administering] migratory flows cannot justify recourse to practices which are not com-
patible with [State] obligations…’.151 States the world over do have a sovereign right 
to control entry into their territories and negotiate joint arrangements to administer orderly 
cross-border movements, but they ought to exercise that power within the limits imposed by 
international (refugee and human rights) law.  Self-serving policies, possibly mistaking 
‘orderly’ migration for the outright containment of unwanted flows, are incompatible with a 
good faith understanding of legal obligations vis-à-vis migrants and those in need of inter-
national protection. Negotiators in New York and Geneva should keep this in mind to avoid 
committing the mistakes of the EU-Turkey deal and MPF framework and uphold the promise of 
a humane, migrant-centred system as the basis of a Global Compact that respects dignity 
and fundamental rights.
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The question which we posed ourselves at the outset was what is a compact and what 
relationship do compacts have with international human rights law, in particular in regards 
to migrants. This question is of great importance in light of the UN’s NY Declaration 
calling for two global compacts, one on refugees and the other for safe, orderly and regular 
migration. Does the form of the international community’s proposed commitments to safe, 
orderly and regular migration, the Compact, affect states’ human rights obligations to 
migrants? The objective of this working paper has not been to give a detailed overview of 
the hierarchy of norms within the UN system. Nor even has it be to pin down exactly what 
legal obligations the Compact may have but rather to examine what a Compact is capable 
of performing and how those functions intersect with human rights.
 
The NY Declaration makes more than 35 references to human rights and the importance 
of ensuring that they are fully respected. Paragraph 5 of the Declaration states “We reaffirm 
also the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and recall the core international human 
rights treaties. We reaffirm and will fully protect the human rights of all refugees and 
migrants, regardless of status; all are rights holders.” There is no doubt that UN Member 
States in adopting the Declaration expressed their full commitment to upholding the inter-
national human rights standards to which they have signed up. So why are there any 
questions about the compatibility of Compacts and international human rights commit-
ments regarding migrants? The problem becomes apparent in the analysis of the Compact 
form. 
As Gammeltoft Hansen sets out in the first section, although the Compact is a soft law 
instrument it is bound to become an important one. It is likely to engage states through 
the inclusion of technical and standard setting norms – often difficult to test against human 
rights claims of individuals who become the end objects of those norms. While human 
rights obligations contained in binding agreements ratified by states will always take priority 
over soft law instruments, the issue becomes state behaviour. Where soft law instruments, 
in creating technical norms, open-ended language and sanction avenues of action for state 
authorities regarding migrants which are of dubious consistency with the human rights of 
those migrants, a slide away from delivery of human rights to migrants can well result. In 
practice, this is a problem which is often encountered in the field of expulsion where tech-
nical norms regarding the speed of expulsion make it no longer possible for migrants to 
mount an effective challenge to the legality of their expulsion.153
  
Soft law instruments do not always lead to greater human rights protection. As Gammeltoft 
Hansen stresses, there is no guarantee that it will improve migrant protection. It is also quite 
––––––––––––––  
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possible, as a number of actors have indicated, that the Compact will be used as a basis 
for new hybrid instruments focusing on migration governance which are designed with 
references to human rights in their preambles but push states towards practices which are 
contrary to their human rights obligations on the basis that such practices are desirably in 
the eyes of their (more powerful) neighbours. 
The term Compact itself is not without difficulties. As Roele points out, in different official language 
version of the NY Declaration different terms have been used which are not consistent with 
a Compact. In fact, it seems that Pact might be a better English term more consistent with 
the French and Spanish official texts. Nevertheless, the proposed Compact will undoubtedly 
by a hybrid instrument which will bundle together norms notwithstanding the lack of clarity 
which underlies the Compact regarding what is safe, orderly and regular migration in any 
event. It is possible, as Roele examines, that a soft law or hybrid instrument can influ-
ence the interpretation of hard law obligations. This can be both forward and backward 
looking – changing the way states apply their human rights obligations to migrants. 
In the next two sections, Panizzon and Moreno-Lax examine other kinds of package deals and 
the human rights impacts which they have had. Panizzon explores the meaning of a packaging 
approach, bringing together diverse policy areas to seek to influence and impact on diffi-
cult policy areas. The issue-linkage of migration with other areas, such as development as 
planned for the Global Compact for Migration, can leverage international agreement but at 
a possible cost. A comparison with linkages in partnership approaches between the 
development of the WTO and the Compact for Migration is interesting. The difference in the 
subject matter however – from goods and services to people often in vulnerable situa-
tions – unravels the comparison. Looking at the examples of EU compacts with third states 
in the field of migration, the problems emerge. In particular the Compact for Jordan 2015 
according to which trade preferences would be accorded to Jordan for goods produced 
with 25% refugee labour and substantial sums would be provided for development on con-
dition that Syrian refugees living in camps in that country abandon their right to leave any 
country guaranteed by Article 13(4) Universal Declaration of Human Rights. But the human 
right belongs to every individual and cannot be bartered away by state authorities which 
are temporarily hosting the individual. Indeed, not even an individual can renounce his or 
her human rights, particularly not for economic gain. But what a compact of that kind can 
do is make it very difficult if not impossible for the individual to exercise his or her right or to 
get a remedy against its denial. By subsuming Syrian refugees into a body and agreeing 
with the host state where they are living that they should not be permitted to exercise their 
human rights in return for a benefit to the country, the individual nature of human rights is 
impaired. The outcomes are not neutral nor do they simply result in better migration 
governance. They actively harm migrants. This is even more apparent in the case of the EU 
compacts with Jordan and Lebanon where the trade-off for reduced tariffs for goods made 
by refugees benefiting Jordan and Lebanon is enhanced enforcement of EU hard border 
control objectives.
Moreno-Lax follows up this quandary by examining the EU Turkey Statement 2016 according 
to which Turkey agreed to take back all Syrian refugees arriving in Greece from their shores 
in return for resettlement of another Syrian from Turkey to the EU. Notwithstanding the 
existence of an EU Turkey Readmission Agreement the parties preferred a more informal 
measure not intended to produce any legally binding effects. So far, the strategy has paid 
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off as a legal challenge to the EU Turkey Deal (as it is called) was held inadmissible by the 
EU’s Court of Justice because it was not in a binding form adopted in accordance with the 
EU Treaties. Evidence of substantial human rights abuses against Syrian refugees in Turkey 
and the lack of a remedy demonstrates just how pernicious soft law instruments can be in 
validating human rights non-compliant actions by states.
 
The message is clear, soft law and hybrid instruments do not necessarily result in better 
human rights protection. In the highly charged field of migration, this is particularly true. 
Powerful states where leaders have used anti-immigrant rhetoric in their political campaigning 
are fully capable of crafting convergence on migration governance policies which are highly 
questionable from a human rights perspective but equally desirable from the political 
perspective of some politicians. Reframing existing human rights obligations in ways which 
purport to diminish protection for migrants is not new. But it always puts strain on the legal 
and judicial authorities which apply the laws. When legislatures permit repressive acts to 
come into force on the basis that they are nonetheless consistent with human rights duties 
because they are founded on good practices set out in hybrid or soft law measures, human 
rights are the victims.
The Global Compact for Migration must not fall into this trap of purporting to signal interna-
tional acceptance of practices which are human rights incompatible. The negotiations must 
not become mired down in questionable trade-offs regarding, in reality, the rights of citizens 
of poor or weak countries in the interests of migration governance policies by stronger or 
richer ones. Rich or powerful countries must not be able to buy their way out of reciprocity 
of migration governance policies which in effect will never be applied to their citizens but 
always to those of other states. Such failure of reciprocity leads inextricably to human rights 
violations as richer or more powerful states are relieved of the need to explain to their citi-
zens why they are being treated so badly in a third country. Instead these states can focus 
on creating a so-called hostile environment for the citizens of weaker and poorer states who 
happen to be present on their territory.  To be truly global the Compact needs to take as 
its starting point the genuine delivery of human rights to migrants wherever they are and it 
must ensure that they have access to justice to defend their rights. 
